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On January 16, the people of Taiwan will go to the polls to elect a new president and new legislative 
representatives. Like the United States, Taiwan has a two-term limit on the presidency, which means 
that the incumbent president, Ma Ying-jeou, must step down. And like the 2016 U.S. elections, the 
2016 Taiwan elections are wide open. 
Ma’s governing Kuomintang (KMT) party enters these elections in complete disarray. Its spring 2015 
presidential primaries resulted in the nomination of a senior legislator named Hung Hsiu-chu, its 
first-ever female candidate for president. But then in an unprecedented move, she was displaced by 
party chairman Eric Chu at a special party convention held on October 17. Chu went on to claim 
Hung’s former place at the top of the ticket. 
Chu is widely viewed as a placeholder candidate with a mandate not so much to win January's 
election as to prevent serious losses for the KMT, especially in the legislature. Tellingly, he has not 
resigned his position as mayor of New Taipei City, Taiwan's largest local government area. He has 
instead taken three months’ leave while an acting mayor watches over his suburban Taipei power 
base. 
Opposing the KMT is the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its candidate, Tsai Ing-wen. A 
veteran campaigner who lost to the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, Tsai is widely expected to emerge 
from the polls as Taiwan’s first female president. She would also be only the second DPP president in 
Taiwan's history. Her predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, president from 2000–2008, was afterward 
convicted of corruption and is now out of jail on medical parole. 
The lawyerly Tsai is a former college professor who likes to compare herself to German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. A better touchstone might be her fellow law professor U.S. President Barack Obama. 
On her father's side, Tsai is a member of Taiwan’s minority Hakka community, Taiwan’s largest 
minority group. The Hakka make up about 15 percent of their country’s population and have 
suffered from centuries of official and unofficial discrimination. Tsai’s commitment to her Hakka 
identity has been questioned in the past. Questions of ethnic and national identity have always been 
at the heart of Taiwan’s politics, but never more so than in the current election. 
TO BE TAIWANESE 
Taiwan has a messy history of invasion, occupation, colonization, refuge, and intermarriage. As an 
ethic and linguistic label, the word “Taiwanese” refers directly to the Hoklo people of southern 
Fujian province, who migrated from the mainland China to the island of Taiwan starting in the 1600s. 
Many came as refugees, fleeing the Manchu conquest of China in 1644–50 that established the Qing 
dynasty. As the remnants of the previous Ming dynasty retreated from the mainland, they 
established an anti-Manchu redoubt on Taiwan. 
The Hakka are an ethnic and linguistic minority in southern China who went on to become an ethnic 
and linguistic minority in Taiwan. Their origins are obscure, but on entering Taiwan in the 1600s, 
they settled in the mountain interior—pushing back the forest frontier against Taiwan's indigenous 
nations. 
Indigenous peoples constitute only a small portion of Taiwan's population today. The only people 
who have an unambiguous claim a Taiwanese identity that has no connection to China, they are, like 
indigenous peoples everywhere, a severely marginalized group. Similarly, the single most important 
political issue for the indigenous peoples of Taiwan is land. 
Finally, Taiwan is home to some latecomers. In a replay of the Ming-Qing transition of the 1600s, 
Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese nationalist government fled the mainland in 1949 in the wake of its loss to 
Mao Zedong's Red Army. Taiwan, recently freed from Japanese occupation, became Chiang’s 
stronghold in his miniature cold war with China. His KMT party declared a state of emergency in 
Taiwan that was only lifted in 1987. 
The result of Chiang’s white terror, as the state of emergency became known, is that Taiwan must be 
the only place in the world where people fondly recall the “good old days” of Japanese occupation. 
(Japan conquered Taiwan in 1895 in the aftermath of the first Sino-Japanese War and ruled the 
island for 50 years until the end of World War II in 1945.) By all accounts, the Japanese occupation 
was severely exploitative, and revolts occurred on a regular basis. But memories of Japanese 
brutality were overwritten by the brutality of the postwar KMT military dictatorship. 
The nationalist Chinese occupation of Taiwan got off to a bad start in 1945. And things got worse 
during the February 28, 1947 228 Incident, Taiwan’s Tiananmen Square. The confrontation arose out 
of a dispute over the seizure of contraband cigarettes. Angry with the KMT’s ruthless exploitation of 
Taiwan’s resources to aid its civil war against the Chinese communists, people came out in 
spontaneous rebellion all over Taiwan. The KMT responded with a massacre, killing between 18,000 
and 28,000 in cold blood and many more in the red scares that followed. 
Today’s KMT carries the heavy burden of its historical roots as the party of occupation. It is clearly 
identified in Taiwanese politics as the “China” party. Although it no longer advocates a quixotic 
invasion of the mainland to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it does agree with the 
CCP that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of it. Since no one seriously believes that 
the KMT will ever be the ruling party of China, the KMT’s “one China” stance is ultimately 
accommodationist. The old enemies are now friends, or at least friendly colleagues. 
Since 2005, the KMT and the CCP have even held regular summits of their party leaders, culminating 
in the November 9, 2015, meeting of their political leaders, Ma and Chinese President Xi Jinping. 
Lauded internationally, Ma received little credit at home for his cross-strait diplomacy. Although he 
won the presidency by a comfortable margin in 2012, Ma is now deeply unpopular in Taiwan. 
Ma's fall from grace was quite sudden. On March 18, 2014, a student group occupied Taiwan's 
legislative chamber to protest deepening economic ties between China and Taiwan. The students 
refused to budge for nearly a month, and their resistance blossomed into the national Sunflower 
Movement, which embraced Taiwan’s distinct national identity. KMT hard-liners pilloried Ma for his 
weakness; DPP activists called for his resignation. Boosted by the momentum of the Sunflower 
Movement, the DPP swept local elections in November 2014. 
Supporters of Taiwan's ruling Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), chairman and presidential 
candidate Eric Chu shout slogans during a rally ahead of Taiwan's election on January 16, in Yuanlin 
City, Changhua County, January 12, 2016. 
If the KMT presents itself as the party of Taiwanese-Chinese unity, the DPP presents itself as the 
party of Taiwanese national identity. But DPP leader Tsai insists that she would make no unilateral 
changes to the status quo of Taiwan's legal limbo. Unlike the previous DPP president, she does not 
publicly advocate a formal declaration of independence for Taiwan. In the absence of a pro-
independence stance from the DPP, it may seem to outsiders like it makes little difference which 
party wins in January. But that isn’t true. 
PARTY ON 
Each of Taiwan’s major parties is at the center of a coalition with multiple minor parties. The KMT 
camp is known as the blue coalition; the DPP camp is known as the green coalition. Where the 
United States has red states and blue states, Taiwan has blue cities and green cities. The KMT blue 
camp is strongest in Taipei’s massive suburban belt and the DPP green camp is strongest in central 
Taipei and in Taiwan’s deep south. These color patterns are no coincidence; they closely follow the 
identity faultlines that run deep through Taiwanese society. 
The blue coalition brings the KMT together with former KMT splinter groups that are even more 
nationalist than the main party. The archetypical supporter of the blue coalition is the clean-cut 
businessman in a dark suit carrying a leather briefcase. Historically drawn from the managers, 
bureaucrats, and plutocrats who fled the mainland after 1949, the power base of this camp is Eric 
Chu’s constituency of New Taipei City. The 1949 generation settled first and foremost in the capital, 
Taipei, but as Taipei matured from a virtual refugee camp into a modern metropolis this group 
moved up and out to suburban New Taipei City. 
The green coalition is a more diverse grouping that unites the DPP with several smaller pro-
independence parties—although not, ironically, the environmentalist Green Party. The archetypical 
supporters of the green coalition are the Taipei university professor and the Kaohsiung blue-collar 
worker. The DPP has dominated politics in Taiwan’s industrial second city of Kaohsiung ever since 
Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s. Kaohsiung’s union movement was an early base of resistance 
to KMT dictatorship. 
Holding a 30-point margin in the latest presidential polls, the green coalition’s Tsai is almost certain 
to win the January 16 elections. This will put the green coalition, which already made a clean sweep 
of Taiwan’s 2014 local elections, in a strong position to set the country’s policy agenda for the rest of 
the decade. But despite the perennial bugbear of a Chinese invasion that China has no capacity to 
undertake, any adjustments in Taiwan's policies toward China will be minor. The changes demanded 
by the DPP and its supporters are important but finely tuned. Taiwan's color revolution is likely to be 
invisible to most observers outside Taiwan. 
In main, that is because the big issue in Taiwan is not independence but identity. International 
recognition of Taiwan's independence is a nonstarter and everybody knows it. A unilateral 
declaration of independence wouldn’t change the fact that China staunchly opposes all diplomatic 
efforts to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation. A declaration of independence might cause a brief 
pause in otherwise improving cross-strait relations, but it wouldn't fundamentally change Taiwan’s 
place in the world—or even its relationship with China. 
Although a Taiwanese declaration of independence would arouse much sympathy in the United 
States, it would not likely result in American diplomatic recognition. Taiwan may be a fellow 
democracy with free and vibrant political institutions, but the United States is a global hegemon with 
global responsibilities and a massive stake in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The United 
States may sell weapons to Taiwan in a tit-for-tat response to Chinese expansionism in the South 
China Sea, but it is not about to start World War III over Taiwanese sovereignty. 
The real revolution of a DPP victory in Taiwan will be a revolution in identity. There is already a 
pitched battle in Taiwan over the teaching of history. In the old textbooks, the history of the Chinese 
people began in the fertile valley of the Yellow River and ended in exile on the rocky island of 
Taiwan. In the new textbooks, the lush island of Taiwan was buffeted by historical forces beyond its 
control but ultimately found its way to democracy, prosperity, and independence. 
The emergence of a distinctively Taiwanese identity is bitterly resisted by the old guard of the KMT, 
but the people of Taiwan overwhelmingly identify either as Taiwanese or as a mix of Taiwanese and 
Chinese. Nearly 90 percent of Taiwanese want equal status for their country in the international 
community. While these numbers are somewhat suspect—the questions seem designed in such a 
way as to elicit a positive response—the overall trend is clear. Although most can trace a Chinese 
heritage, very few people in Taiwan want to be Chinese. 
American pundits often discuss whether the United States should accommodate China through the 
Finlandization of Taiwan or even abandon Taiwan to China. Such analyses are at least 30 years too 
late. Taiwan will never again be part of China. That train has left the station. Taiwan is a highly 
successful country of more than 23 million people with its own politics and its own place in the 
world. Admittedly, that place may fall short of what many Taiwanese people want for their country, 
but it is nonetheless secure. January’s election won’t change that 
